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Abstract 
The article provides a framework of the Self, understood as a dynamic semiotic 
system in constant evolutive tension rather than a system in equilibrium adapting to the 
environmental changing conditions. The aim of the whole special issue is indeed to 
provide new hints for the reflection about the relationship between Self and semiosis, 
from both the theoretical and philosophical points of view. The articles of Salvatore, 
Luleci and Silva Filho & Dazzani, discuss the relationship between the Self and the 
ideas of context, agency, belief and action as co-constitutive of the subject. The Self, 
as high level semiotic instance, is the process that results of and regulates the 
uniqueness of the experience in irreversible time. The continuity of the stream of Self 
and the culturally codified ways of producing signs about the experience in the world 
are also discussed. The articles of de Souza, de Mattos & Chavez, Fivush, Simao & 
Sampaio, instead, discuss the process of semiosis in different periods of the lifespan. 
Guimaraes, questions the generalization of Self across cultures, presenting the notion 
of “multiple selves”.  
Keywords: Semiotic Self; Tensegrity; Holes, Wholeness, Evolutive tension. 
Resumo 
O artigo fornece uma estrutura do Self, entendido como um sistema semiótico 
dinâmico em constante tensão evolutiva, em vez de um sistema em equilíbrio, 
adaptando-se às condições ambientais em mudança. O objectivo deste número da 
Interacções é fornecer novas pistas para a reflexão sobre a relação entre Self e 
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semiosis, segundo perspectivas teóricas e filosóficas. Os artigos de Salvatore, de 
Luleci e de Silva Filho e Dazzani discutem a relação entre o Self e as ideias de 
contexto, agência, crença e ação como co-constitutiva do sujeito. O Self, como 
instância semiótica de alto nível, é o processo que resulta de e regula a singularidade 
da experiência no tempo irreversível. A continuidade do fluxo de Self e as formas 
culturalmente codificadas de produzir sinais sobre a experiência no mundo são 
também discutidas. Os artigos de Souza, de Mattos e Chaves e de Fivush, Simão e 
Sampaio, por sua vez, discutem o processo de semiosis em diferentes períodos da 
vida. Guimarães, questiona a generalização do Self entre culturas, apresentando a 
noção de "múltiplos selves".  
 
Palavras-chave: “Self” semiótico; Tensegrity; Totalidade; Tensão evoutiva. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
I can talk about myself. That’s a matter of fact. I can tell something about me at 
present, making distinctions and similarities between “how I used to be”, “how I am 
now”, and in case imagine “how I will be in the future”. At the same time, I can talk 
about myself with a sense of continuity between the past and the present, and this 
“thought is sensibly continuous” (James, 1950, 225). I can even compare myself to 
someone else. In other words, I can produce a meaningful combination of signs that 
describes a system of psychological, affective, bodily and social characteristics I can 
label “my Self”. To accomplish this task, I can use a repertoire of signs originated in 
different contexts: parents, teachers, peers, literature, advertisement, therapists, 
pictures, blog posts, etc. (Hermans, 1996; Iannaccone, Marsico & Tateo, 2012; Zittoun, 
2006; 2012). If I have any creative skill, or if I am incidentally schizophrenic (Wrobel, 
1990), I can even create brand new signs to describe my own Self, like for instance in 
Francis Bacon’s periphrasis “The Arch-flatterer, with whom all the petty flatterers have 
intelligence, is a man’s self” ([1597] 1985, 54). Nevertheless, this discourse can 
emerge only through the mediation of symbols: one can tell, draw, narrate, express, 
remember, dance or play the Self. This raises several questions about the relationship 
between the Self and the combination of signs used to represent it. For instance, the 
semiotic approach to the Self implies at least two dimensions: the longitudinal genesis 
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and elaboration of the Self and the relationship between the Self and the environment. 
These approaches, such as Peirce’s and Mead’s, conceptualize it by the triad 
“I-present-sign, you-future-interpretant, and me-past-object” (Wiley, 1994, 215). Of 
course, the problem of the Self, its nature, features, development and uniqueness is 
one of the fundamental issues of human thinking. It is not worth to mention here the 
infinite number of philosophical, psychological, logical works about it. The only 
common point that can be underlined is that something like the Self must exist, to the 
extent that this idea forms the cornerstone of the Western culture’s building.  
William James talked about the individual “inner or subjective being” (James, 
1950, 296). Despite James’ concept of Self is extremely elaborated, depicting a 
complex and open system ahead of his times, what we want to stress here is the idea 
of the Self as a sense of consistency, agency and awareness, a process rather than an 
“entity” located somewhere “inside” the person. In this special issue authors explore 
different aspects of the way human beings construct that complex, multifaceted and 
someway still mysterious experience called “Self”. How the Self is genetically 
constructed in semiosis, culturally inflected and situationally experienced? The 
contributions stress the psychological and philosophical perspective about the way 
culture constructs the Self and the Self constructs (and expresses through the 
mediation of) culture. 
The Semiotic Construction of Self  
The semiotic nature of psychological processes implies that experiencing and 
semiotizing are quite overlapped phenomena (Valsiner, 2002). Thus experiencing the 
(or by the) Self, must be strictly related to the possibility of producing signs about the 
Self. In this sense, the Wittgenstein’s famous sentence in the preface of the Tractatus: 
“what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must 
pass over in silence” (1922, 27), acquires a different fashion. We can talk clearly about 
things that we don’t experience “personally”, drawing from a repertoire of signs, social 
representations, imagination, etc. In the case of the Self, instead, there is a direct 
experience, even though signs mediate the construction of such an experience 
(James, 1950; Peirce, 1965; Wiley, 1994).  
The cultural semiotic perspective considers the production of a sign as a feature 
of individual’s acting upon the world within irreversible time (Sampaio & Simao, in this 
issue; Valsiner, 2002). We add that producing a sign implies a movement of 
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differentiation, segmentation and abstraction from the flow experience in the 
irreversible time, co-creating both the Self and the context (Herbst, 1976; Salvatore, in 
this issue; Valsiner, 2002). But signs regulate both the flow in the present and provide 
guidance to cope with the unknown future. The semiotic process implies the 
construction and destruction of hierarchies of signs (Peirce, 1965; Valsiner, 2002). 
Thus, starting from a movement of differentiation, the semiosis goes back to a new 
form of more abstract generalization, which comprises again the world as a wholeness, 
that is no longer the phenomenological stream of consciousness (James, 1950), rather 
the cultural wholeness of hypergeneralized signs (Valsiner, 2002).  
Nevertheless, to some extent only a part of what we experience as our Self is 
immediately accessible through signs mediation. Thus, it exists something we have 
immediate experience of but we cannot talk “clearly”. There are two apparently 
opposing sides of the coin.  
On the one side, the Self is basically a dialogical process, semiotically 
constructed during childhood and adolescence, involving multiple voices expressing 
different points of view, modulated by specific sets of beliefs and experiences 
(Markova, 2006; Valsiner 2002). Young people interact with significant others, 
experiencing a dialogical and contractual space where adults and peers voices provide 
different “as-if” possibilities, contributing to define what a person could be in present 
and in future time (Iannaccone, Marsico & Tateo, 2012). The Self progressively comes 
into contact with other’s “voices” and is asked to negotiate, reject or accept the different 
possible definitions provided (Simao & Valsiner, 2007). The Self is thus the dialogical 
instance that organizes the different situated identities and voices at stake in the 
person’s network of social relationships.  
On the other side, the experience of Self is not immediately and totally accessible 
by the others and through other’s mediation. We become aware of this inaccessible 
region of the Self partly because of our incapability of perfectly understanding others 
(James, 1950). At the same time, we become aware of the difficult to make our own 
Self totally transparent to ourselves and the others (Silva Filho & Dazzani, in this 
issue). Something still remains unsaid. It is because we can’t talk clearly about it, thus 
we are not experiencing it?  
In semiotic perspectives, the Self is constructed starting from the child's active 
internalisation of the social interactions. The Self first appears as an interpersonal 
phenomenon: “I am a social relation of me to myself” (Vygotsky, 1989, 67). Others act 
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and refer to the individual as a Self-entity and in turn he responds to the others through 
signs-in-interaction (words, gestures, artefacts, etc.). By internalising, the child's “self 
comes to use the signs, once directed to others or received from others, in relation to 
the self” (Holland & Lachicotte, 2007, 108). This process implies that the definition of 
Self is expressed externally and is experienced internally (Bakhtin, 1986; Mead, 1934). 
The Self is polyphonic and dialogical from its very origin, related to the collective 
meaning and social judgment of the culture the individual belongs to.  
Through the active internalisation of social relationships and the inner dialogue 
between socially valorised voices of the Self, the child learns how to manage 
interactions, how to understand emotions and the value of agency (Holland & 
Lachicotte, 2007). The Self thus coordinates the experiences in the relationship with 
others in different contexts and of regulating his own inner life and social behaviour 
with respect to the problems of everyday life. Internalization and mediation provide 
individual with the means to talk clearly about oneself. This implies that the Self is 
culturally guided, whereas culture provides the symbolic resources to model the 
experience and the expression of Self (Valsiner, 1997; 2002; Zittoun, 2006; 2012). But 
on the other side, the Self is exactly the term the defines the uniqueness of my inner 
experience and my agentive capability of making distinction between what happen, or 
used to happen, to me and what relates to others. When I produce a discourse about 
my feeling guilty or anguished, I can say that I feel “like” Rodion Raskolnikov in 
Dostoyevsky’s novel “Crime and punishment”. I can also say that I feel “like” my friend 
felt once. But at the same time, I am conscious that my feeling is a unique event that is 
not perfectly framed in a pre-formed fashion or captured by the same signs already 
used by myself or by others in the past (James, 1950). “Humans consist of present, 
future, and past; sign, interpretant, and act; I, you, and me; and all the overlap, and 
connectedness, and solidarity among these elements” (Wiley, 1994, 216). We are in 
the presence of an apparently paradoxical situation (Figure 1).  
I experience two types of uniqueness: of the experience that happens once in 
irreversible time and of myself experiencing; and two types of similarities: of myself as 
stream of Self and of the culturally codified ways of producing signs about the 
experience of Self. In this sense, guidance and appropriation are a complementary 
couple that must be always considered as a whole.  
 
 THE SELF AS TENSION       6 
http://www.eses.pt/interaccoes 
 
 
According to Peirce (1965), this relationship between uniqueness and guidance 
is resolved through the hierarchical and synthetic features of semiosis. Each act of 
interpretation indeed leads to a higher level of complexity and synthesis, becoming the 
object of a new semiotic cycle. This process establishes a progressive abstract 
hierarchy of signs, whom the Self could be considered the highest degree of synthesis. 
On the other side, the Self as sign is subject/object of semiosis, ensuring that the 
continuous development over time is not a teleologically closed system. This semiotic 
cycle can be found also in James’ idea that: “The self experiences itself as experience 
of being other than the otherness. In other words, the experience of otherness (i.e. the 
presence of the object for the subject) feeds the otherness of the experience (the 
recognition of the subject as something more and else compared to the experience and 
as such the source as well as the target of the experience) that feeds it, in a never-
ending circle” (Salvatore, in this issue). 
The idea of the semiotic cycle can account for the co-constitutive relationship 
between the Self and the environment and the complementarity between uniqueness 
and guidance into irreversible time. As Wiley explains:  
“All signs are semiotic triads, consisting of "sign," interpretant, and object, but 
humans are triads in a unique way. They are the signs behind the signs, or to put 
it another way, they are bi-Ieveled signs. The triadic semiotic structure of the self 
is the same as the triadic relation the self has to time. Sign, interpretant, and 
object are also present, future, and past. This means that for humans time is not 
just a line or continuum, nor even an experiential or "felt" flow. It is these things to 
Uniqueness	  of	  Self	  
Uniqueness	  of	  experience	  Culture	  guidance	  
Stream	  of	  Self	  in	  irreversible	  time	  
Figure 1: Uniqueness and similarity in the Self 
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be sure, but in addition it is a reflexive circuit of meaning (Giddens, 1991, pp. 1-
9). It is a "history" in the sense of a narrative or story. The present constantly 
projects and re-projects the meaning of the past onto the future (Jacobs, 1984, 
pp. 30--44). Time is an inherently meaning-generating process. Or, to put it 
another way, it is a semiotic flow within which one segment (the present) shapes 
another (the future) in response to a third (the past). The three temporal legs are, 
at the same time, the three semiotic elements. For humans, the structure of time 
and that of the self-as-sign are the same. Not only are they both triadic, they are 
the same triad, looked at in different ways” (Wiley, 1994, 217-218). 
Nevertheless, there is always the risk to conceptualize the Self in terms of 
stability, continuity, adaptability, still evoking an fixist and essentialist vision, while the 
semiotic cycle implies the historicity of the Self (Pizarroso, 2013). Guidance and 
appropriation in the construction of Self through semiotic cycle lead to a higher level of 
structure and functional organization, that has been often conceptualized as a system 
in equilibrium between two phases of disequilibrium (De Souza, in this issue; Erickson, 
1968; Piaget, 1936). Whereas the production and interpretation of signs always leads 
to the crystallization and fixation of a part of the meaning, which constitutes the legacy 
of the Self continuity in the culture (Fivush, in this issue; de Mattos & Chavez, in this 
issue), semiosis is a process of tension rather than equilibration. Whether one agrees 
on a strong – the Self is a sign – or mild – the semiotic nature of subjective experience 
– version of the semiotic Self, the tension is related to the fact that the Self is basically 
an acting agent, so that in the very end “to reflect is to interpret one’s own flow of signs 
(but not in the idealistic sense, since it also involves emotions and feelings) in order to 
act” (Silva Filho & Dazzani, in this issue). The semiotic construction of Self is related 
the child’s need to tune his own action with the world and the others’ irregularities, 
implying the inevitable need to make sense of errors (Peirce, 1956), and to the adult’s 
need to find his own way to coordinate agency, deed and universal categories of good 
and evil (Luleci, in this issue).  
This is one of the innovative ideas that the whole picture of the contributions 
collected in this issue suggests: tension, rather than equilibrium, is the theoretical 
concept that can help to understand the semiotic construction of Self. 
Tensegrity and the Self 
In classic physics, the concept of tension is related to that of deformation. That is 
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tension results from an ongoing process of adaptation of a system to the changing 
conditions of the environment, under the form of vector of forces acting upon the 
system. In this view, the system is in equilibrium when no environmental forces are 
exerted upon it. This idea has been often imported in psychology, as for instance in 
Gestalt theory with the Zeigarnik’s effect (Zeigarnik, 1967) or in field theory (Lewin, 
1936; 1939). In this case, tension is generated by the conflict between the organism’s 
tendency to maintain a status of equilibrium, or to move towards a new equilibrium, and 
the changing conditions of the environment opposing such a tendency. In this case, 
only two outcomes are possible: deformation, understood as a metaphor of adaptation, 
or rupture and both the outcomes put the question of the organism’s identity. To what 
extent the organism is “identical” to itself in case of adaptation or rupture? Or in other 
words, to what extent the idea of Self’s continuity can be understood in terms of 
equilibrium out of tension?  
The idea of tension as a constitutive element of systems has been developed into 
the concept of “tensegrity”, a contraction for “tensional integrity”, which has been 
initially formulated with respect to innovative architectural structures (Fuller, 1961). The 
idea is that tension is not a pathology of a system, rather one of its complementary 
constitutive elements, providing stability and integrity. Every system, natural of artificial, 
is made of sub-parts that are in a hierarchical relationship of continuous tension and 
discontinuous compression, which is called “self-stress” or “prestress”. “As the term 
‘tensegrity system’ implies, the interplay between the tension and compression 
elements may be interpreted as a whole as systemic behaviour unpredictable from the 
behaviour of the parts considered individually” (IUED, 1978, 261). The tensegrity 
principle found several theoretical applications for instance in biology (Ingber, 2003) 
and social sciences (IUED, 1978) (Fig. 2). “Our bodies provide a familiar example of a 
prestressed tensegrity structure: our bones act like struts to resist the pull of tensile 
muscles, tendons and ligaments, and the shape stability (stiffness) of our bodies varies 
depending on the tone (prestress) in our muscles” (Ingber, 2003, 1158). 
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Figure 2 - Tensegrity structures. Source: IUED, 1978, 262. 
 
As in the example of human body, tensegrity principle is not acting only at the 
level of the structure, but also at the level of the functions of the sub-parts. Indeed, in a 
tensegrity system, the sub-parts specialize in functioning as modular sub-systems with 
their own tensegrity organization, which is functional to the maintenance of the whole 
system integrity. “It is the unique equilibrium (made possible by a tensegrity pattern) 
between what unites (i.e. the tensional network) and what divides (i.e. the many distinct 
compressional incompatibilities) which gives rise to (and derives from) the new kind of 
organizational structure” (IUED, 1978, 260). Thus, environmental pressure does not 
exert on a system in a state of static equilibrium, rather interact with a self-stressed 
system which is already in a state of dynamic tensegrity.  
Take for instance the particular kind of structure in figure 3: the Pavilion of the 
Federal Republic of Germany by the architects Frei Alto and Rolf Gutbredhe, at the 
Expo 1967 in Montreal, whose theme was “man and his world”. 
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Figure 3 - Tension as structural feature 
  
In this example, tension cannot be considered as a momentary condition of 
environmental pressure upon the system, is rather a constitutive element of the system 
itself. It is also worth noting that the tension is related to the ratio between peaks, 
hollows and holes. In this kind of structure, the interruption of tension would lead to 
both the deformation and the rupture of the system. In this specific case, tension, 
equilibrium and identity are no longer opposing rather complementary concepts. But 
the Pavillion is still a static structure, a closed system, no development is possible.  
Consider now an open system, like the representation of William James’ idea of 
the stream of consciousness in relation the identity of the Self, presented in figure 4.  
11     TATEO, MARSICO  
http://www.eses.pt/interaccoes 
 
Figure 4 – James’ illustration of the unity of consciousness (1950, 283) 
 
James’ original explanation of the figure is: 
“Let it be the thought, 'I am the same I that I was yesterday.' If at the fourth 
moment of time we annihilate the thinker and examine how the last pulsation of 
his consciousness was made, we find that it was an awareness of the whole 
content with same most prominent, and the other parts of the thing known 
relatively less distinct. With each prolongation of the scheme in the time-direction, 
the summit of the curve of section would come further towards the end of the 
sentence. If we make a solid wooden frame with the sentence written on its front, 
and the time-scale on one of its sides, if we spread flatly a sheet of India rubber 
over its top, on which rectangular co-ordinates are painted, and slide a smooth 
ball under the rubber in the direction from 0 to 'yesterday,' the bulging of the 
membrane along this diagonal at successive moments will symbolize the 
changing of the thought's content in a way plain enough, after what has been 
said, to call for no more explanation. Or to express it in cerebral terms, it will 
show the relative intensities, at successive moments, of the several nerve-
processes to which the various parts of the thought-object correspond” (James, 
1950, 283). 
Beyond the visual similarities between figures 3 and 4, what is relevant here is 
that also James’ stream metaphor includes continuous tension in the form of peaks 
and hollows. Change and continuity are thus not conceptualized in terms of alternation 
between equilibrium and tension, rather in terms of differential of potential (“relative 
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intensities, at successive moments”) within the stream of consciousness. In this way, 
the dynamic element is brought into the picture. Nevertheless, James figure does not 
provide for holes, to the extent that even the potential interruption of the stream of 
consciousness during the sleep is rejected (James, 1950).  
The Impossible Aesthetic of Self 
As human beings, we have a natural aesthetic feeling that guides the 
understanding of the world around us, to the extent of guiding our perception of the 
shape and the content of the things we deal with. The tendency to capture the 
wholeness of the perceived object is one example of this aesthetic feeling. Gestalt 
theory (Wertheimer, 1912; Koffka, 1935) offers a conceptual apparatus in explaining 
the processes that lead us in perceiving the totality like something different to the sum 
of their distinguish parts. Look at the very well know Kanizsa’s triangle (1980) (Fig. 5). 
 
Figure 5 - Kanizsa's triangle 
 
No single closed object is in this figure, but by overlooking the totality, we 
perceive regular triangles instead of the discrete elements. We are able to grasp a 
wholeness making connection among the parts. 
Paying attention to this special visual phenomenon, we easily see that wholeness 
is made through emptiness. A large empty space exists among the not closed objects. 
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Nevertheless, they are in connection each other thanks to an invisible tension between 
them. By assuming a limited vision, our natural aesthetic feeling (as a tendency in 
perceiving the “beauty” of the whole) fails with a sense of internal discomfort. 
The holes that compose the whole are disquieting objects as well as the existing 
tension (commonly perceived as negative force) which links each other. How all of this 
deals with the Self? 
We usually conceptualize the Self as an entity, whose main feature is the 
consistency over time. This kind of definition fits with our aesthetic feeling, but seems a 
very simplified vision when we look at the ordinary life of each and every human being. 
We are constantly in moving, transiting from one space to another, assuming different 
roles, having very many different identities. How is it possible that all this come 
together? The Self notion has to deal with this multifaceted complexity. What is the 
relationship between this discrete “objects”?  
Following the suggestions arisen from Kanizsa’s triangle (Fig. 5) we can 
conceptualize the Self not as filled concept, but in terms of dynamic tension between 
wholeness and emptiness. In such a way we must admit the impossibility of an 
aesthetic sense of Self.  
Self Needs the Holes 
As in James’ and Kanizsa’s examples, psychology seems to reject vacuum, 
everything should be filled by some concept, not considering that the Self as a whole 
could include "holes" as well, like in the Henry Moore's sculpture (Fig. 6). 
The apparent opposition between “full” and “empty” can be depicted as that of 
inclusive separation (Valsiner, 1997), that makes possible a kind of joint completion. 
The opposites are distinguished and separated from one another but, at same time, 
they enter into a relationship with one another. This relationship becomes the basis for 
the functioning of the system that includes them. That mutual integration recognizes 
the “full<>empty” distinction using it to have a careful look at the boundary of two 
categories.  
The issue of boundary is very central in Mereotopology – a qualitative 
mathematical perspective in contemporary philosophy – whose abstract principles 
shed light on the parts-whole relations (Smith, 1997; Varzi, 1998), providing some 
theoretical hints to understand the holes and their peculiar relation with the whole 
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(Varzi,1997).  
 
Figure 6 - Henry Moore in his study, working at the preparatory model for a sculpture at 
Kew Garden 
 
A hole does not exist without its complement - the host - and it is not the owner of 
its boundary, since the boundary of a hole is the surface of its host. Hole is bounded 
from the outside and it is a special example of interconnection and of Complementarity 
Principle (Bohr, 1948/1998). 
Acting like “membrane”, the boundary simultaneously separates and unifies the 
connected parts of a whole (Herbst, 1976; Marsico, Cabell, Valsiner & Kharlamov, 
2013) or, in other words, the emptiness with the wholeness.  
What keeps this configuration up is a dynamic tension among full and empty 
parts of the system. Locating on liminality of those parts and on borders, the tension, 
while shaping the surfaces of the single elements (keeping the open/close distinctions), 
allows the communications and the exchanges from one side to another. By stressing 
the porosity and the inhomogeneity of the Self, it is possible to provide an alternative 
perspective on Self, no longer conceived as a static entity, but rather as a system in 
perennial tension whose main features are the instability and the capability to cope with 
the uncertainty of lived experiences.  
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Why does the Self need the Holes? For surviving and developing. Human beings 
are naturally oriented toward development and change. The entire human existence is 
played on the borders between inner and outer parts of the Self (Marsico, 2013). If the 
self is conceptualized as a stable and static structure, how its develop take place? Like 
the grass grows in the interstitial spaces along the street, also the Self needs the holes 
as a semiotic space for the emergence of novelty.  
Wholeness, Emptiness and their boundaries are the elements that create an 
evolutive tension of the Self. In our view the semiotic construction of Self emerges from 
the emptiness that is not a symbolic void. On the contrary, the emptiness is both highly 
idiosyncratic, divergent, ambivalent, sensitive to the context and dynamically 
interconnected with the whole representing, in such a way, a real semiotic source.  
Concluding Remarks 
The aim of this special issue is to provide new hints for the reflection about the 
relationship between Self and semiosis. The authors have tried to reflect upon some 
fundamental questions about the Self and the semiosis, both from the theoretical and 
philosophical point of view and their unfolding life span.  
The three articles of Salvatore, Luleci and Silva Filho & Dazzani, reflect upon the 
relationship between the semiotic approach to the Self and the ideas of context, 
agency, belief and action. The discussion of the philosophical and epistemological 
foundations of the semiotic Self leads to the idea of these elements as co-constitutive 
through an evolutive tension. Thus the Self, as higher level semiotic instance, is the 
process that results of and regulates the uniqueness of the experience in irreversible 
time and of the Self experiencing, on one side, and the continuity of the stream of Self 
and the culturally codified ways of producing signs about the experience in the world. 
The other contributions, instead, focus on the historical and genetic nature of the 
semiotic Self. By using different research materials, the authors explain why the Self 
must be understood as an historical concept, with its own history and geography, both 
at the individual and cultural level. The tendency to reify the Self (Pizarroso, 2013) is 
indeed rooted in the forgetting of how the concept of Self has been constructed in our 
individual lives – through a very dialogical and hard fought process. De Souza, de 
Mattos & Chavez, Fivush, Simao & Sampaio, instead, bring phenomenological 
evidence of this process of semiotic cycle in different periods of the lifespan. While 
Guimaraes, underlines the historicity of the theoretical construction of the idea of Self, 
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by questioning the generalization of this psychological “entity” to all the cultures and 
claiming the notion of “multiple selves”.  
Thanks to the contribution in this special issue, we are able to stress some 
innovative ideas about the semiotic approach to the Self. First, the Self is a dynamic 
semiotic system in constant evolutive tension, rather than a system in equilibrium 
adapting to the environmental changing conditions (fig. 7). Secondly, rather than the 
concept of stability and continuity of the Self, it is more fruitful to develop the idea of 
tensional integrity to account for the complementarity between uniqueness and 
guidance in the construction and development of Self.  
 
 
Figure 7 – The Self as a tensegrity dynamic system 
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Tensional integrity emerges from the co-genetic complementarity between 
Wholeness, Emptiness and their boundaries. In this respect, psychology has mainly 
focused on filling the holes and hollows of Self with concepts, without paying enough 
attention to the possibility that the Self system could be also made by empty zone. The 
further developments of the idea of Self as dynamic tensegrity semiotic system will 
contribute to fill this gap. We argue that semiosis, in the form of novelty, emerges 
exactly from tension and emptiness, understood as the feed-forward semiotic act 
(Valsiner, 2002) of producing a sign where no light has been yet shed on the unknown 
future. 
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